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'The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security
front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic
and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on
both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.'
US Secretary of State, June 1945
'We must make sure that the UN is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham,
that it is a force for action and not merely a frothing of words, that it is a true
temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung,
and not merely a cockpit in the Tower of Babel.'
Winston Churchill, Fulton, Missouri, 1946
It is conventional to say that the descent of 'the iron
curtain' - a much better known phrase of Churchill,
also first used in the speech quoted above - held
back for 45 years the full flowering of the United
Nations, as envisaged by its founding fathers.
There is, no doubt, much truth in this. Virtually the
whole of international politics and economics,
policy making and popular perspectives were con-
ditioned and influenced, and often controlled by
and directed to the Cold War and its ramifications.
By the late 1980s, world military expenditure has
risen to about $1,000 billion each year $800 billion
in the industrial countries and some $200 billion in
developing countries. With an average of 5 per cent
of the GNP of industrial countries, and rather more
of the Third World income, going to military
activities, it is hardly surprising that so much of
international life was affected.
1 UN ACHIEVEMENT
Given all this, it is also perhaps surprising that the
UN has achieved so much. Consider, for instance,
the UN's achievements in:
presiding over a widespread and historically
unprecedented process of decolonization and trustee-
ship, under which the empires of Britain, France,
Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal were disman-
tied and well over a 100 countries came to inde-
pendence and sovereign statehood - taking the UN
membership from the original 51 member states in
1945 to 185 in 1995;
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negotiating into existence a wide frame of inter-
national conventions ort human rights, for the first
time in history encouraging all countries to ratify
such conventions and creating an international hu-
man rights institution and machinery to monitor
and report on their implementation;
institutionalizing the machinery of the security
council and the international court of justice, both
designed to replace rule by national force with rule
by international law and enforcement through col-
lective action;
through its specialized agencies - notably WHO,
UNESCO, ¡LO and FAO - providing the interna-
tional machinery for monitoring and analysis of
global trends in such vital sectors as health, educa-
tion, science and culture, employment and wages,
and food and agriculture;
through its funding agencies - UNDP, WFP,
UNICEF, UNFPA and IFAD - supporting and
mobilizing activities towards an impressive range
of development goals and actions;
building up an international machinery for re-
sponse to man-made and natural emergencies and
disasters;
establishing or continuing a core of other inter-
governmental agencies - highly specialized techni-
cal bodies and secretariats, helping to ensure co-
ordination and support for international operations
in key technical areas, such as telecommunications
and broadcasting, postal services, shipping and
maritime operations, meteorology, civil aviation
and atomic energy.
Finally, one must note the Bretton Woods Organi-
zations - and the regional development banks.
Though the IMF and World Bank play a much
more limited role than envisaged when they were
devised and funded and play this role virtually
outside of the United Nations, of which they were
clearly intended to be a main part, their existence
and influence is considerable, in policy and finance,
for at least the poorer countries of the world.
In looking at this range of machinery for interna-
tional governance, several remarks are in order.
First, the staff and total cost of the UN's core admin-
istration is, relatively speaking, remarkably light-
weight. The total numbers and cost of the staff
involved is well under that of Seattle - or most
other middle sized cities in the main industrial
countries. It is, and always has been, a fraction of
what the major powers spend each year on their
military forces.
Second, the issues covered by the organizations is
impressively large and the core budgets of a num-
ber of the specialist bodies, typically less than $100
million a year. Indeed, one often wonders whether
those denouncing the irrelevance and waste of the
UN's bureaucracy ever realize that the quiet effi-
ciency in the international process of allocating
wavelengths, ensuring international standards of
air and maritime safety, providing a frame for re-
ciprocal arrangements among postal services all
depend on part of the United Nations.
Third, the benefits, when they can be measured, are
impressive in terms of what the world now saves
each year by some of those achievements which the
UN system has brought into being. The most obvi-
ous of these achievements is the eradication of
smallpox. First proposed by the USSR, smallpox
eradication was initially treated as a propaganda
gimmick. But by 1966, the World Health Assembly
had formally agreed on smallpox eradication as a
goal and international effort. By 1977, the last field
case was identified in Somalia - and three years
later, smallpox eradication was officially certified.
The total cost of the global effort was estimated to be
$300 million, just under $100 million by the interna-
tional agencies and about $200 million for national
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action. Annual savings were estimated (in the 1980s)
to be at least $1,500 million a year, in terms of the
savings on no longer needed vaccinations, surveil-
lance, health controls and certificates for immigrants.
Fourth, actions currently underway, are bringing,
and will bring, further impressive benefits. Con-
sider the current effort to eradicate polio by the year
2000, one of the goals of the WHA endorsed at the
World Summit for Children in 1990. Already 45
countries are reported as polio free and the whole
of the Americas (North, South and Central) are
certified as having had no case for three years. The
number of cases world wide has fallen from 400,000
a year in the mid 1980s to under 100,000. But the
benefits of eradication will be much greater. When
this has been athieved, polio immunization will no
longer be necessary - saving the United States an
estimated $270 million each year and the European
Community $200 million. The total worldwide
savings including the estimated savings from death
and disability each year is estimated by WHO to
be a further $1,500 million in current prices.
Is this positive perspective intended as a one sided
attempt to show that the UN has nothing but a fine
record of achievement? No. The UN has obvious
weaknesses and it has failed or proved itself inad-
equate to many challenges. But it has had, I believe,
many more successes than often credited and its
first 50 years may well be judged by historians more
favourably than present moods and reactions often
suggests. Churchill's comment sums up the point,
'Democracy is the worst form of government, except
all those other forms of government that have been
tried from time to time'. Moreover, as Richard von
Weizäcker, Germany's former President, recently
stated, criticism of the UN bureaucracy is often 'an
excuse'. He added, 'reforming the bureaucracy
will not change the organization's effectiveness as
much as reforming the will of the members - the
most important members'.
Indeed, one should ask: what is or what would
have been the alternative to the United Nations?
Unilateral or bilateral action? Collective action by
the industrial countries or by the major military
powers? Regional action? International anarchy?
In certain areas, each of these has, in fact, been
tried - or is de facto the main form of international
action - or inaction. In the economic arena, the G7
and the OECD are the most obvious manifestations
of these alternatives. And it is interesting and most
significant to note that the effectiveness of these
partial mechanisms of multilateral governance are
also much questioned, even though these groupings
make no attempts to cover the range of issues, let
alone bridge the range of different interests, which
the UN involves.
But in assessing effectiveness, one must also ask
some basic questions, obvious in themselves per-
haps, but too often forgotten or underplayed, in
assessments of the United Nations, especially by
the industrial countries.
Who is the UN? Press commentaries contribute
daily to a major confusion by referring to 'UN deci-
sions' or 'UN actions', without distinguishing
whether they are:
decisions by governments within the UN,
whether within the General Assembly, the Secu-
rity Council or one of the other subsidiary bodies;
actions taken by the UN secretariat directed by
specific decisions of governments;
initiatives taken or not taken by the secretariat in
relation to situations such as emergencies;
the effectiveness of different specialized agencies
or bodies of the UN.
The mechanisms and responsibilities underlying
each of the above are very different. As a start, it
would greatly help understanding and perceptions
if public statements and press releases made it clear
which aspect of the UN was being referred to.
Effectiveness from whose point of view? Most of the
strongest criticisms of the UN in recent years come
from the industrial countries. Many of the develop-
ing countries feel less critical - except perhaps, of
the Bretton Woods Organizations, where the rela-
tive strength of praise and criticism between the
industrial and developing countries is usually
reversed. And sample surveys of public opinion
often show surprisingly positive views of the UN
among the general public.
2 THE UN IN THE 1990s - AND THE
CHALLENGES AHEAD
Under the current Secretary-General, Mr Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, innovative efforts have been made
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to define the United Nations' mission and policy in
several key areas of policy. 'Agenda for Peace' was
perhaps the first and most successful, building on
Summit level Security Council meeting of January
1992, and defining four major areas of peace related
actions in the post-Cold War world:
preventive diplomacy;
peace making;
peace keeping;
post conflict peace building - reconstruction
and reconciliation and development.
The different parts of the UN's own machinery and
organization have increasingly been involved in all
four of these activities, together with forces pro-
vided bilaterally from many UN Member States.
Expenditure by the UN on peace keeping activities
has risen from US$230 million in 1988 to $3.6 billion
in 1994, while the number of disputes and conflicts
in which the UN is involved each year has risen from
11 in 1988 to 28 in 1994. Since Member States are
committed to contribute their share of expenditure,
once the Security Council has approved the inter-
vention, these expenditures have gradually added
to the financial obligations of Member States and,
in parallel, to the amounts owed but unpaid to the
UN, in respect of their obligations.
With respect to economic and social development,
the evolution of thinking, debate commitments and
action, has followed a different pattern. Although
the Secretary-General has proposed a parallel policy
document, Agenda for Development, the process
has proved more complicated and much more con-
troversial. The first draft of the Agenda identified
five dimensions of development: peace as the foun-
dation; the economy as the engine of progress; the
environment as a basis for sustainability; justice as
a pillar of society; democracy as good governance.
But going beyond generalities to the specifics of
international action has proved more difficult. It is
arguable that such difficulties are inevitable, espe-
cially if the task is seen as defining a global agenda
for development which is intellectually pioneer-
ing, operationally useful, applicable to all regions
of the World and which commands consensus.
And identifying roles and actions to be taken by
the different parts of the UN system is inevitably
challenging to vested interests within and outside
the UN system.
Although governments have repeatedly asked for
further revisions of Agenda for Development, the
practical purposes for which the Agenda is wanted
may be better achieved by building on the commit-
ments and follow up actions already agreed at the
succession of major global conferences held in the
1990s:
The World Summit for Children, New York, 1990;
The International Conference on Environment
and Development, the 'Earth Summit', Rio, 1992;
The World Conference on Human Rights,
Vienna, 1993;
The International Conference on Population and
Development, Cairo, 1994;
The World Summit on Social Development,
Copenhagen, 1995;
The Fourth World Conference on Women,
Beijing, 1995.
Each of these conferences has given rise to commit-
ments and to some form of plan or programme of
action, identifying responsibilities within the inter-
national community and UN systems for follow up
action, resource mobilization and monitoring. They
provide, therefore, a basis for action on important
parts of the development agenda:
human development, covering health, educa-
tion, nutrition, water sanitation;
gender equality and equity, reproductive health,
family planning and women's empowerment;
poverty reduction, especially through income
generation among the poorest, employment crea-
tion and household food security;
measures to achieve greater social cohesion; and
a wide range of basic human rights.
'Agenda 21' of Rio incorporated many of the
above, and set them in the context of commitments
to sustainable development and environmental
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protection covering formal treaties for biological
diversity and climate changes. And all the con-
ferences and commitments made reference to the
special needs of least developed countries in gener-
ally and usually sub-Saharan Africa in particular.
3 INTERNATIONAL AND UN ROLES
The international community, and the United
Nations itself, has already been given critical roles
to play in supporting the preparation, the imple-
mentation and the monitoring of the national pro-
grammes of action. Governments must of course
take the lead, define all the objectives, the scope and
the type of strategy, programme or plan to be fol-
lowed. But depending on the country, its capacity
and resources, the international community can have
a major or a minor supporting role. Particularly
important in all this, will be the need to consolidate
at national level the process and documentation of
follow up to the various conferences.
This approach needs to be followed in all the prior-
ity areas of action identified above. But it can be
illustrated by considering poverty eradication - as
a major area for action arising from the recent
Copenhagen Summit.
A focus on poverty eradication ought to be made
a major - but not exclusive - part of the United
Nations mission over the next quarter century. This
would help define the UN mandate in human and
popular terms in a way which might, in turn, help
to rekindle some of the early idealism and vision
which typified the United Nations in its first decade.
Moreover, steady progress towards the different
goals, (and early achievement of some of them such
as the eradication of polio by the year 2000) would
demonstrate success in international action in hu-
man terms, more readily and more convincingly
than with the more difficult and inevitably less
decisive peace keeping efforts.
A focus on poverty eradication would also help
define some of the common goals for UN field
operations which are needed to achieve and demon-
strate effective coordination. A frame of human
development and poverty eradication has already
been set out conceptually in recent documents of
UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA. The challenge now is
to mobilize the energies and organization of UN
field operations in ways which provide practical,
consistent and sustained support for countries in
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Figure 1 sets out how this could be done, emphasiz-
ing the two main thrusts of poverty reduction -
the provision of basic social services for all and
the achievement of minimum levels of house-
hold incomes and food security for all, with action
focused especially on the poorest groups. This was
the poverty reducing strategy set out in the Wor%d
Bank's World Development Report on Poverty,
issued in 1990.
Within the UN and at field level, UNICEF and
UNFPA would have major roles in mobilizing sup-
port and finance for basic services for all, working
closely with WHO and UNESCO, the specialized
agencies most directly involved with health and
education. In parallel and with complementarity,
UNDP, IFAD and UNIFEM would have major roles
in ensuring credit, food security and support for
income generation for the poorest, working closely
with ILO and FAO, the specialized agencies most
directly involved with employment generation (in
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both the formal and informal sector) and household
food security.
Implementation will mostly be a matter of national
action but in the least developed countries and in
most of sub-Saharan Africa, national programmes
will also require special measures of international
support.
The UN resident coordinators at country Xevel would
have a general coordinating role for these efforts,
using the Country Strategy Note as a frame for
action whenever governments find this appropri-
ate. Monitoring will be vital and UNDP, UNFPA
and UNICEF can use field resources to support
country level data collection, processing and pub-
lication, drawing on specialist expertise within the
UN, including of the UN Statistical Office.
The World Bank has its own important part in
almost every aspect of poverty eradication strate-
gies and support, derived from its role as a major
lender of resources and usually also, as leader and
mobilizer of the donor community. Part of the logic
of the above approach, however, is that the total
international effort is likely to be stronger the more
the UN family can strengthen and coordinate its
own efforts before it simply falls into line behind
Bretton Woods leadership.
There are good reasons for maintaining this impor-
tant aspect of independent UN contribution and
leadership. On the Bretton Woods side, both the
World Bank and the IMF (and probably now the
WTO) have made clear that while they welcome
cooperation with the UN, they in no way wish to
be coordinated by the UN. The UN organizations
start historically and structurally with a different
and more focused perspective on poverty and
human development than either of the Bretton
Wood organizations.
The international system as a whole will be stronger
(and more democratic) if such differences of per-
spective and approach are brought out openly in
discussion and international debate, rather than
made matters of behind-the-scenes compromise
with a pretence of organizational coordination. The
history of UN-Bretton Woods relationships shows
how debate over initial differences has often lead
to innovation and advance for all. The creation of
IDA, the initiation of IMF's compensatory finance
facility, actions on debt relief and Adjustment with
a Human Face are all examples of how open debate
between the UN and the Bretton Woods organiza-
tions helped initiate changes of policy and approach
within the Bretton Woods institutions. Further ad-
vances are needed and could follow with respect to
actions to accelerate poverty reduction and human
development.
4 GOALS, COORDINATION, ADVOCACY AND
ETHICAL COMMITMENT
Against this background, let me draw on UN
experience to elaborate a number of the issues of
international action - and potential and compara-
tive advantage - which too often get neglected in
assessing the present workings of the UN or in
making recommendations for reform.
Goals: In the first few decades of the UN, quantified
time-bound goals were agreed for a number of areas
of national and international action. Perhaps there
were too many and certainly many were not taken
very seriously by governments in devising or moni-
toring follow up action. By the late 1970s, the mood
of many countries, especially industrial countries,
had swung considerably against goals.
Notwithstanding the doubts and difficulties, a core
of key goals is needed if commitments to achieve-
ments and results are to be specific - and not just
to be vague aspirations. Moreover, the record of
international goal setting is not so bad as often
thought: the GNP growth rate target for developing
countries of the (First) Development Decade was
exceeded, and over the Second Development Dec-
ade nearly achieved. Though most aid donors have
fallen far short of the 0.7 per cent target for ODA,
the target itself has served as a major focus for
mobilizing political and NGO support for increas-
ing aid - and at least six aid donors have achieved
the target, in a reasonably sustained manner. Goals
in other areas such as child mortality reduction,
health, education, water, sanitation and nutrition
have also provided important mechanisms for
mobilizing accelerated national action. Scores of
countries have, in fact, achieved many such goals -
even over the 'lost decade of the 1980s', when the
goals often helped to maintain some human and
social priorities during a period of tough minded
economic cutbacks and adjustment.
National Action. One reason why global goals
become discredited is that too little attention has
been given to the process of adopting and adapting
global goals to the situations of different countries.
This certainly seemed to be a major weakness of the
process of follow up to many of the goals and
commitments of the series of major international
conferences held over the 1970s.
Experience in UNICEF and WHO and UNFPA over
the 1980s shows that goals can lead to very positive
results, especially when field offices of the UN
agencies concentrate their energy, action and their
resources in helping individual countries translate
global goals into national plans and action.
Global goals were added in the 1980s to UNICEF's
country programme approach, focused initially on
priority actions like immunization and promotion
of oral rehydration therapy, to reduce the major
causes of child mortality. The results were impres-
sive. Most countries achieved impressive increases
in coverage of these priority health actions and 72
countries achieved the 1990 goal of 80 per
cent immunization coverage, resulting (with
ORT advance) in an estimated reduction of child
mortality by some four million child deaths
each year.
This successful experience spurred the idea of hold-
ing a World Summit for Children in the United
Nations in September, 1990, to mobilize world-
wide action at the highest political level for a further
round of goals for children. At the time, the idea
of an international conference for Heads of Govern-
ments on a social theme was novel, if not somewhat
gimmicky. Heads of State normally assembled to
discuss weighty matters of politics, not children
or social policy, let alone infant mortality and
diarrhoea. Sceptics argued that few would come
and that the meeting and its deliberations would
have little effect. But in the end, 71 Heads of Gov-
ernment and State attended. Counting subsequent
signatures by Heads of State and Governments, the
Declaration and Plan of Action have now been
signed by 164 Government leaders, and most signa-
tures by Heads of State of any document in history.
More impressive, some 100 counties have now pre-
pared National Programme of Action, focused on
the goals for the 1990s agreed at the Summit UNICEF
estimates that the majority of developing countries
are making substantial progress towards the goals
get for the year 2000 - and well over half are likely
to achieve half or more of the mid-decade goals set
for 1995. UNICEF now presents each year to
ECOSOC and the General Assembly a report on
progress and produces more popular versions of the
report in the form of two widely circulated docu-
ments, The State of the World's Children report
and Progress of Nations. All this adds up, in my
view, to the type of public accountability on sub-
stantive progress and achievement which should be
much more common in the international system.
Coordination. Coordination is currently the most
emphasized aspect of UN reform in the economic
and social arenas. A common view is that the UN's
weakness stems from a plethora of different UN
agencies, each competing with others for funds or
visibility, instead of concentrating on the tasks given
by their mandates. Better coordination is seen as
an important part of the answer, with full integra-
tion of some agencies and abolition of others as
essential steps.
Some rationalization would no doubt be useful -
but this should follow, not precede, clearer deci-
sions on priorities for action. Moreover, many
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actions to achieve more serious and effective co-
ordination have been set in motion in the last few
years. These embrace measures at country level to
strengthen the Resident Coordinator system, in-
cluding the preparation (under government leader-
ship) of a Country Strategy Note, clearly guide-
lines on collaboration, harmonized programme
cycles, moves to common premises and the estab-
lishment of a common training system for senior
field level staff.
But experience suggests that collaboration in sup-
port of common goals is the most important step to
achieve greater effectiveness. In the first place,
goals (adapted to the national situation) provide a
common focus for action and a common test of
achievement. In the second place, goals take one
beyond the internal interests of competing bureauc-
racies - to the contribution each can make to the
country concerned. Value added and comparative
advantage between agencies are best judged, not
in the abstract, but in relation to capacity to work
towards defined goals.
Advocacy and Ethical Commitment. The focus
on goals and practical achievements is important -
but, in the long run, helping to establish a climate
of opinion and ethical standards required to under-
pin an international system in which human rights
are respected and the basic needs of all people
are met. Building such an ethic and climate of
opinion is far from a vague and woolly aspiration or
matter of a few feel-good speeches and an appeal
to high ideals. As UNICEF experience shows,
morality marches hand in hard with capacity. By
showing what can be done, expectations of what
ought to be done can be changed. The United
Nations has a special role and opportunity in this
effort - and a number of outstanding leaders within
the UN have demonstrated at different times what
this can mean. Dag Hammarskjold, the second
Secretary-General is perhaps the clearest example.
But other Secretaries-General and Directors-
General of different agencies have also demonstrated
the capacity for international leadership and out-
spokenness in ways which helps chance public
opinion and establish new standards of expected
international conduct.
In a world in which perceptions and values are so
influenced by the media, this is perhaps the greatest
challenge and the greatest opportunity for the United
Nations today.
